The dynamics of frame-bridging : exploring the nuclear discourse in Scotland by Brown, Antje
  
 
 
 
 
The dynamics of frame-bridging: exploring the nuclear 
discourse in Scotland 
Antje Brown 
 
 
Date of deposit 02/06/2017 
Document version Author’s accepted manuscript 
Access rights © 2017 Edinburgh University Press. This work has been made 
available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is 
the author created accepted version manuscript following peer 
review and as such may differ slightly from the final published 
version. 
Citation for 
published version 
Brown, A. (2017). The dynamics of frame-bridging: exploring the 
nuclear discourse in Scotland. Scottish Affairs, 26(2), 194-211. 
Link to published 
version 
https://doi.org/10.3366/scot.2017.0178 
 
Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research 
Repository at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
1 
 
The Dynamics of Frame-bridging: exploring the nuclear discourse in Scotland 
Abstract 
Simple indicative factors such as political populism and resource abundance cannot fully 
explain the Scottish Government’s anti-nuclear energy policy. To grasp the current policy 
stance, it is necessary to pay attention to the wider contextualisation of policy framing and 
specifically the dynamic of story-telling and frame-bridging that ultimately feeds into 
governmental policy. The Scottish Government’s decisive NO to a new nuclear fleet can be 
better understood by considering the underlying (and deliberate) bridging of policy frames 
that is noticeable between environmental, pacifist, and Scottish independence actors. This 
bridging not only affects the individual sets of story-telling but also develops a dynamic that 
reinforces individual stories and transcends well beyond the groups’ original remit and 
objectives. With the help of policy framing analysis, research interviews and documentary 
analysis, the article explores the dynamic connections between anti-nuclear and independence 
activists and their causes in Scotland. The article highlights their triangular bridges in terms 
of personnel, language and story-telling and argues that these are instrumental in shaping the 
Scottish Government’s anti-nuclear energy policy. 
 
Key words: policy-frame analysis, Scottish governance, nuclear discourse. 
Introduction 
Political discourse and public policy are shaped by discursive opportunity structures and 
political story-telling unique to any given system and society. Discourse is not determined by 
straight-forward cost-benefit analyses of political elites but rather by the continuous 
construction and framing of policy positions and stories formed by open and fluid actor 
memberships. In some cases, two or more previously separate policy frames are (intentionally 
or unintentionally)  connected, thereby developing a dynamic which not only consolidates 
and reinforces the framing and expression of individual policy stories, but also influences the 
constellation of the discursive opportunity structures themselves, whilst reasserting certain 
identities of actor groups as well as their relationships. 
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It is against this backdrop that the following article analyses the Scottish nuclear discourse. 
Synergies between civil and military nuclear debates vis-à-vis Scottish independence have 
been noted in the past (see, for instance, Heffron & Nuttall 2014), however the dynamic that 
these triangular linkages produce require further attention as these have an impact on further 
nuclear policy decision-making and, indeed, UK-Scottish inter-governmental relations. The 
nuclear discourse (be it civil i.e. nuclear energy or military i.e. nuclear deterrence/ coercion) 
has been a contentious and polarised one fought at many levels. Considering the sheer 
volume of arguments, statements and actors on either side of the debate, it is interesting to 
note the clarity and determination with which the Scottish Government has not only declared 
its opposition to nuclear energy in Scotland (with a decisive NO to new nuclear power plants 
and a phasing-out of the two remaining nuclear power stations: Hunterston B and Torness), 
but also its opposition to military nuclear deterrence (with Trident at the heart of its 
campaign). With a moratorium on fracking (until 2017) restricting the energy mix further as 
well as concerns over Scotland’s long-term energy security (as raised recently by the 
Institution of Civil Engineers Scotland), the question arises as to how it is possible for the 
Scottish Government to maintain its determinately anti-nuclear position? With a U-turn 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, the answer may be found in the dynamic of policy-frames 
and story-telling particular and inherent to Scottish politics and society.  
With the help of policy framing analysis and targeted qualitative research, the following 
article explores how the two stories of civil and military nuclear power are bridged into an 
inter-connected framework, thereby contributing to a policy that is distinctly (and 
uncompromisingly) anti-nuclear. This anti-nuclear stance gathers further momentum through 
another frame-bridging connection with the wider, ongoing story-telling and framing process 
relating to the Scottish (national) identity and self-determination. This triangular bridging 
between environmental, pacifist and Scottish independence activists not only reinforces their 
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individual causes and identities, it also helps cement joint agendas and a collective identity. 
The article shows how the Scottish Government reflects this dynamic story-telling and how it 
translates it into the public policy context. It argues that while the Government cannot claim 
unreserved public support in its anti-nuclear stance, a lack of forceful or effective veto power 
allows the Government to pursue its stance.  
Setting a Conceptual and Methodological Framework 
Coming from the research discipline of politics, the author is currently teaching Sustainable 
Development (SD) at a Scottish University. This association has exposed the author to more 
inter-disciplinary (and arguably more holistic, normative and participatory) thinking as well 
as a willingness to explore research methods that may transcend conventional and 
disciplinary boundaries. One such insight is the reflexive manner with which SD scholars 
identify and construct their research project. The idea for this particular study arose from 
initial observations and preliminary comparisons of different nuclear energy policies. These 
observations revealed an emerging and increasing policy divergence which was further 
heightened by the Fukushima incident in 2011. This divergence was observed not just 
between states (e.g. Germany and France) but also within states (i.e. between Scotland and 
the rest of the UK), a trend occurring despite a general sharing of two essential challenges: 
the need to provide for energy security whilst simultaneously tackling climate change. These 
observations inspired the author to explore the underlying reasons behind the distinct 
determination with which the Scottish Government has pursued its anti-nuclear policy.  
There are ample indicators that would suggest the need for a change in Scottish policy: for 
instance, nuclear energy contribution formed an important and integral part of the overall 
energy mix seeing only a small fluctuation in recent years from a 34.9% to 34.3% to 34.4% 
share in Scotland’s overall energy mix (Scottish Government 2016) with commentators in the 
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media and energy sector branding the Scottish Government’s nuclear phase-out policy as 
‘naïve’ and ‘foolish’. And yet: a political U-turn appears to be unlikely. It could be argued 
that the driving forces are not so much based on sober, rational scientific reasoning but rather 
reflect normative and political considerations borne out of the frame-bridging and story-
telling unique to the Scottish polity. True, certain factors lend their support to the current 
policy stance; for instance, Scotland’s expertise in hydropower and, more generally, its 
expanding renewables sector are testament to Scotland’s competitive edge in seeking 
alternative energy sources.1 While this renewables advantage may contribute to the current 
policy stance, it cannot explain the whole anti-nuclear policy story. Similarly, the perception 
of an ‘us versus them’ attitude between Holyrood and Westminster (as perceived by a Labour 
MSP, research interview, 29/6/12) or the argument that the Scottish policy is different simply 
because it can be different, do not capture the whole story of the anti-nuclear policy in 
Scotland. It is argued here that it is necessary to consider the wider context i.e. the 
complexities and interconnections between actor groups in Scotland and their policy stories 
and journeys. In the case of current Scottish nuclear policy (or rather: policies), Scotland’s 
stance vis-à-vis nuclear energy is based on previous frame-bridging between civil and 
military nuclear energy policies as well as the frame-bridging between nuclear issues and 
Scottish self-determination, together forming a triangular and dynamic policy scenario. In 
their insightful analysis Scotland, Nuclear Energy Policy and Independence, Heffron and 
Nuttall (2014) acknowledged the link between civil and military nuclear debates vis-à-vis 
Scottish independence but then steered clear of these synergies. While their investigative 
focus lay elsewhere, it certainly encouraged the author of this article to investigate these 
synergies further. More specifically, this study focusses on the following research 
proposition: 
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The framing and bridging of three, seemingly separate (even disparate), issues can contribute 
to a dynamic that affects not only stakeholder perceptions of policy reality as well as the 
public policies themselves, the frame-bridging also affects the actors involved as well as their 
relationships and alliances within discursive opportunity structures. 
As the above use of terminology already suggests, the study is informed by policy framing 
literature (e.g.  Schön & Rein 1994; Benford & Snow 2000) and shares an interest in ‘the 
politics of signification’ (Hall, 1982) whilst acknowledging the construction of collective 
identities and ‘shared meanings’ (Gamson, 1992). It notes the importance of speech acts, as 
well as varying perceptions of policy realities and the inter-linkages between actor reflections 
and policy adjustments. Actors and their story-telling are considered within the contexts of 
political (or more specifically: discursive) opportunity structures which are defined as 
specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for 
social mobilisation, which either facilitate or constrain social mobilisation (Kitschelt 1986). 
Within these structures, policy frames operate as ‘structures of belief, perception, and 
appreciation which underlie policy positions’ (Schön and Rein, 1994). As Reber and Berger 
(2005) would put it, frames are ‘interpretive structures through which individuals organise 
and make sense of an ambiguous stream of events and issues in the world’. Policy framing 
refers to the actual process of forming and articulating views, perceptions and beliefs. These 
are akin to the politics of signification, i.e. the process of forming and constructing collective 
identities, speech acts as well as reflections and evolving ideas, all influenced by the 
contextuality of political or discursive opportunity structures. There are many types of 
framing, which Benford and Snow (2000) usefully summarise and categorise. The most 
intriguing, and for this study most relevant, category is the process of frame-bridging, which 
adds a dynamic and indeed vital dimension to the conceptual framework. As Benford and 
Snow (2000, 624) put it, frame-bridging ‘refers to the linking of two or more ideologically 
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congruent but structurally unconnected frames […].’ This notion of linking is reminiscent of 
strategic bandwagoning, a term used by Jinnah et al (2011) to describe and highlight the 
deliberate and strategic overlap of interests and policy missions in order to affect policy 
change. Other, and to a certain extent related, types of framing include those characterised by 
the extension of interests into other areas of interest and the amplification of sets of values. 
All these processes have multiple impacts and can develop a dynamic that goes far beyond 
the specific group or issue involved at the outset. Not only can these complex and inter-
connected frames reinforce identities, objectives and relationships, they can also cement 
certain sets of beliefs – as is the case with the anti-nuclear stance presented by the Scottish 
Government - and can have knock-on effects on other discourses that are not necessarily 
within the remit of the original policy issue.    
With these conceptual ingredients in mind, the author conducted a documentary analysis of 
Scottish policy frames, examining discourses relating to civil and military nuclear power and 
connecting these to wider discourses on Scottish self-determination. NVivo software was 
used to identify and then analyse inter-linkages and synergies between the policy frames and 
then highlight areas where these inter-linkages contributed to a new dynamic in policy-
making in Scotland. The author focused in particular on documents and statements over a 10-
year period (2005-2015) from actor groups prominently involved in the civil and military 
nuclear discourses; these include the Faslane Peace Camp, Scottish CND, Friends of the 
Earth Scotland, LINK Scotland, and members of the Scottish Parliament and Government. 
The findings sheds light onto overlaps in terms of language and personnel sharing while also 
drawing attention to the active frame-bridging between stories and actors’ pooling of 
resources which, ultimately, translate into an anti-nuclear policy formulation.  
Contextualising the Scottish nuclear energy discourse 
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Political discourses, story-telling and frame-bridging have to be understood as embedded in a 
wider political context. In the case of Scottish nuclear energy discourse it is necessary to 
contextualise the structures within which actors operate. Scotland is currently relying on an 
energy mix to meet its own energy demands and energy export (27.9% in 2013; 23.7% in 
2014, see Scottish Government Energy in Scotland, 2016) to the rest of the UK. Whilst 
pursuing climate change targets of greenhouse gas emission reduction of 80% on 1990 levels 
by 2050, with an interim target for 2020 of a 42% reduction on 1990 levels (Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009), Scotland is committed to renewable energy and electricity targets, for 
instance meeting at least 30% of energy demands from renewables and delivering the 
equivalent of 100% of gross electricity consumption from renewables by 2020 (Routemap for 
Renewable Energy Scotland, 2011; Electricity Generation Policy Statement, 2011). In recent 
years, renewables and nuclear sectors generated nearly two thirds (64.2%) of Scotland’s 
electricity output and the nuclear output has seen a slight fluctuation from 34.9% to 33.3% to 
34.4%. Yet, despite this minor fluctuation, the Scottish Government is determined to see out 
the last fleet of nuclear power stations and rules out their replacement. Like other UK nuclear 
power stations, commissioned in the 1960s to early 1990s, the two remaining Scottish nuclear 
power stations - Hunterston B in North Ayrshire and Torness in East Lothian – are 
approaching the end of their ‘lifetimes’ and the question arises whether to extend their 
‘lifetimes’, decommission them permanently or replace them with a new generation of 
nuclear power plants. While the current UK Government is pursuing a policy of facilitating a 
new generation of nuclear power stations, the current Scottish Government is taking an 
opposite stance, summed up as:  
- Nuclear energy generation is not necessary in the long-term; 
- in a post-nuclear Scotland it will not be necessary to import energy (in other words, 
Scotland will remain energy secure); 
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- supporting the nuclear option would prove to be expensive and dangerous in the 
long term. 
 
There is, obviously, a policy divergence from the rest of the UK, which had emerged before 
both governing parties – the Conservatives in Westminster and the SNP in Holyrood - entered 
office. The current disparity in policy can be traced back to an ongoing dispute spanning 
several decades and involving actors from the whole spectrum of the party political landscape 
as well as other, non-parliamentary, actors. One key milestone was a heated debate in 2001 in 
the House of Commons on the issue of nuclear energy, which was further fuelled by a rift 
within the then Labour Government, which in turn was resolved by a compromise put 
forward by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair. In effect, Blair conceded that the final 
decision whether or not to commission new nuclear power stations in Scotland would rest 
with the Scottish Parliament and Government (The Glasgow Herald 2002, The Scotsman 
2006). Since then, consecutive UK Governments have steered well clear of Scottish sites for 
nuclear energy development, allowing the current Scottish Government to express, and 
pursue, a ‘no chance to nuclear’ energy policy. The sentiments of SNP politicians such as the 
then SNP Energy Minister Jim Mather, who put it bluntly: ‘Scotland does not want or need 
new nuclear power’ (Scottish Parliament Question Time, 2008), are very much reflected in 
numerous official documents such as the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 and the 
Electricity Policy Statement of March 2012. Furthermore, the Scottish Government 
commissioned Scottish Generation Scenarios and Power Flows, published in November 
2011, provided further evidence in favour of the Scottish Government’s anti-nuclear energy 
policy. Indeed, in a research questionnaire the Scottish Government’s Energy Markets Unit 
confirmed to the author that there is a ‘clear divergence in policy [between Holyrood and 
Westminster] with regards to new-build nuclear power. […] Scotland’s abundance of wind 
and wave/ tidal power mean that a future energy mix in Scotland does not need to be 
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dependent on new nuclear power stations, which are expensive to build, expensive to 
decommission and leave a legacy of hazardous waste.’ (Written response to online survey, 
May 2012)  
Evidently, a crucial point of departure in the nuclear energy discourse is the question whether 
to pursue the commissioning of a new fleet of nuclear power stations, which would ensure the 
longevity of the nuclear energy sector and, arguably, energy security in Scotland for the long-
term. Having outlined the general policy context, we can now move on to exploring the story-
telling that preceded and contributed towards the Scottish policy stance. In order to 
understand this stance, we need to consider the underlying policy frames involved and, more 
importantly, consider any bridging between these frames and their stories. To what extent do 
the linkages between policy frames generate a dynamic that contributes towards this 
determined anti-nuclear approach? To allow for reliability and credibility, it is necessary to 
check for causal links, more specifically dynamic connections, synergies and symbiotic 
relationships between the different policy frames: civil and military nuclear energy and 
Scottish self-determination. Are the bridges between frames deliberate and intentional or just 
coincidental? And do they matter in the policy formulation? To try and unpick these 
dynamics and connections, this analysis focuses on documentary discourse analysis by 
collecting and evaluating documents and statements from influential actors in the Scottish 
nuclear debate - particularly the anti-nuclear debate -, checking for joint or shared language 
and paying attention to connections between policy frames in terms of data, documents and 
personnel.  
Data analysis 
For the purpose of this project, data research and analysis was narrowed down to 53 
documents (listed in References below) produced by nine key groups prominently involved in 
the story telling and construction of normative values in the target frames: nuclear energy, 
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nuclear deterrence and Scottish self-determination. The groups were identified as significant 
in the frame articulation and involvement in their particular spheres of interest.  
The following section summarises the key findings from the documentary analysis. Firstly, 
the analysis confirms a wider perception conveyed by researchers (e.g. Chalmers and 
Wallace, 2013) and story-telling actors that both nuclear stories and the Scottish self-
determination story have been historically and incrementally linked together long before the 
SNP took governmental office. With statements such as ‘nuclear power was introduced as a 
cover to produce nuclear weapons’ (Scottish National Party Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, http://www.snpcnd.org/power.php), thereby firmly connecting civil and 
military nuclear stories, the frame-bridging extends into the Scottish self-determination story: 
the location of both nuclear power stations, nuclear material production sites and nuclear 
military bases continue to be considered as determined (if not imposed by) by the UK 
Government. Some of these historical connections are based on myths and conspiracy 
theories, yet they still have an effect on the story-telling and the bridging of frames in 
general. The overall, socially constructed and normative triangular link is reflected not only 
in the language that anti-nuclear movements (civil and military) and Scottish independence 
campaigners apply, but is also evident in the cross-over of personnel from one frame to 
another. High profile examples include First Minister Nicola Sturgeon who was a CND 
member before she joined the SNP. For her, opposing nuclear deterrence and indeed the 
general notion of strategic military coercion, specifically in the form of Trident missiles, is a 
matter of principle and ‘not a bargaining chip’. The First Minister is not the only actor 
connecting the two frames, other connections were confirmed during the research of this 
project. For instance, one research respondent stated that they held vice chair positions in 
both Scottish CND and SNP, although not simultaneously but in succession (email 
correspondence, 3/7/14). 
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Also, in terms of campaigning, the research uncovered numerous examples that illustrate how 
actors from the different groups pool their resources with relative ease. The following 
examples illustrate the diversity of linkages:  
* Anti-nuclear protesters from the Faslane Peace Camp and Scottish CND joined 
forces with the radical independence campaign to organise joint events entitled 
Another Scotland is possible, targeted at Edinburgh and Glasgow University Freshers.  
* MSPs from the SNP and the Scottish Greens were involved in Peace Camp protests 
(e.g. representing the ‘North Gate Crew’) and hosted visits to Holyrood by Peace 
Camp delegations (e.g. to screen the ‘Visit Faslane’ film by the Camcorder 
Guerrillas). 
* Friends of the Earth Scotland not only addressed the issues of civil and military 
nuclear power simultaneously, they also considered Scottish autonomy as 
instrumental in reaching their anti-nuclear objectives. For instance, with reference to 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the FoES Director welcomed Scotland as ‘one of the 
world’s leading nations saying no to new nuclear power stations’, while also openly 
supporting the Scottish Government in their rejection of ‘the UK’s nuclear waste’ and 
‘nuclear weapons of mass destruction’.  
It is interesting to note how both anti-nuclear groups – civil & military - utilised the discourse 
leading up to the Scottish Independence Referendum in September 2014 to not only bring 
their particular causes to the forefront of the political debate, but also to use the referendum 
and its possible aftermaths as an obvious and deliberate bandwagoning opportunity to 
combine, reinforce and, indeed, amplify their particular anti-nuclear causes. In fact, their 
active cross-referencing developed an interesting binary dynamic in that it strengthened the 
supporter base on Scottish independence, whilst keeping the momentum and pressure going 
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regarding nuclear issues; issues that would have had to compete with a range of other public 
policy issues. In a sense, the period leading up to the Scottish Referendum represented a 
critical juncture for anti-nuclear activists and an opportunity to consider and strengthen 
potential scenarios, strategies and alliances. Their assessment of the situation boiled down to 
(what anti-nuclear story-tellers would describe as) a rational thinking process: an 
independent Scotland would have a written constitution that would enshrine the importance 
of the environment. This, according to the FoES Director, would be the ‘single most powerful 
environmental argument in favour of a yes vote’ at the Scottish Referendum. Similarly, the 
Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament argued that ‘[i]n the event of Scottish 
independence, the parliament in Edinburgh would have the legal right to require the London 
government to remove nuclear weapons from Scotland’. Indeed, ‘[a] prohibition of nuclear 
weapons, or all Weapons of Mass Destruction, could be written into the constitution of an 
independent Scotland’. It is therefore not surprising that Scottish CND openly supported the 
Yes Scotland campaign as Scottish independence would have been, according to the Scottish 
CND, ‘the most immediate and effective way of getting rid of Trident’. The Scottish CND 
Coordinator put it simply: ‘Vote Yes – Rid Scotland of Trident’. This reasoning was mirrored 
by the then Scottish Government Environment Minister Richard Lochhead in a speech on 
independence and the environment in April 2014:  
The power of a written constitution [following on from a Yes vote] is also at the heart 
of the second green gain of independence – ensuring that an independent Scotland is a 
nuclear-free nation – free from weapons of mass destruction and no more nuclear 
power stations. […] Scotland has […] been home to one of the largest concentrations 
of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. Weapons which continue to be based in 
Scotland despite majority public opposition and the views of civic society, our 
churches, trade unions and a majority of Scotland’s MSPs and MPs. With 
Independence, Scotland will be able to reject nuclear weapons and any proposed new 
nuclear power stations and we would have the opportunity to write this into our 
constitution. Scotland could make one of the biggest statements of principle: We will 
be a safe country, a clean country, a nuclear-free country.  
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There are, evidently, deliberate frame bridges constructed by various actor groups and 
spanning across anti-nuclear non-governmental organisations and Scottish Government. 
These resulting policy stories are diametrically opposed to Westminster policies of a new 
nuclear energy generation as well as a new arsenal of nuclear weapons. The Scottish policy 
framing suggests a strong and deliberate overlap of discourses in terms of story-telling, social 
construction and shared identity. And yet, there are certain aspects that are unique to each 
actor group and policy frame. The anti-nuclear deterrence/ coercion side stands out in that it 
collaborates closely with representatives from the STUC and churches in Scotland (as 
evidenced in Church of Scotland (2006) Trident: UK nuclear weapons at a crossroad, as well 
as the ‘Scotland’s for peace’ and ‘Scottish Clergy against Nuclear Arms’ campaigns)and 
explores arguments that centre around employment and social wellbeing. For instance, in a 
joint CND-STUC report on the future of Trident missiles in Scotland, the authors carefully 
considered the economic and employment costs & benefits if both Faslane and Coulport 
naval bases were to relocate to England. This collaboration, however, does not divert from 
the triangular story-telling described above; rather it extends the frames to other actors and 
their particular priorities and stories. The STUC may not be entirely united on the issue, as 
recent wrangling between officials suggest. However, large sections are committed to the 
anti-nuclear cause and maintain close ties with the anti-nuclear policy frames. This extension 
of frames and story-telling adds support (rather than a distraction) to the frame-bridging 
dynamic and offers an enhanced sense of legitimacy to the anti-nuclear cause in Scotland.  
On a final data analysis note, it was interesting to see how the use of language evolved in the 
story-telling with new terminology emerging to reinforce certain messages and constructed 
truths. This may be unintentional or intentional, depending on authors and origin of the 
document. In the run-up to the Scottish Referendum, for instance, both scholars (such as 
Chalmers and Walker 2013) and activists revealed a liking for the abbreviations RUK 
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(Remaining UK) and rUK (rest of the UK) and although associations with these abbreviations 
were highly speculative (i.e. in the event, the UK remained intact), the frequent use of this 
politically laden terminology in both anti-nuclear power and deterrence documents further 
suggests the notion that anti-nuclear causes and Scottish self-determination are tied together.   
Overall, the data gathered suggests that Scottish nuclear policy frames and their actors are 
connected in terms of language, personnel, shared beliefs and campaigns. The data 
particularly highlighted the bridging between the stories of anti-nuclear movements and 
Scottish self-determination, with the latter lying at the core of the Scottish Government’s 
normative ambitions. To a certain extent it could be argued that the Scottish Government 
pushed for a determinately anti-nuclear policy (and thereby denying Scotland of a nuclear 
energy future) out of ‘us versus them’ motivations which may be considered as somewhat 
populist in nature. To what extent these motivations actually influenced the policy content is 
not entirely clear. However, to observers such as the Labour MSP interviewed 29/6/2012, the 
policy stance by the Scottish Government was perceived as an ‘us versus them’ measure. 
Certainly the whole nuclear debate in Scotland has to be considered within the wider political 
dichotomy between pro and anti-independence forces. While these ‘us versus them’ 
motivations may have had a role to play in the Scottish policy formulation, it is the more 
intricate and deeply-rooted triangular stories that determine the Scottish Government’s 
policy. And this triangular story-telling emerged and developed long before the SNP took 
governmental office in Scotland and conducted the Scottish Referendum in 2014. It is 
because of these deeply-rooted connections that the following statements by the Scottish 
Government come as no surprise: 
Through the powers of independence we can ensure we build a cleaner, greener and 
nuclear-free nation, and Scotland can fulfil its potential to be a beacon of 
environmentalism and sustainability. 
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This Government will reject any proposals for new nuclear power stations and will 
secure the speediest safe withdrawal of nuclear weapons in Scotland.  
The power of a written constitution is also at the heart of the second green gain of 
independence – ensuring that an independent Scotland is a nuclear-free nation – free 
from weapons of mass destruction and no more nuclear power stations. 
Scotland’s Future and the Environment (2014)  
 
Conclusions  
The above analysis confirms the research proposition set at the beginning of this project that 
seemingly separate issues and their policy frames, when bridged through language, personnel 
and shared stories, can develop a dynamic that not only affect the actors, their identities and 
relationships themselves, but also their (shared) stories and policy ‘realities’. This dynamic 
effect can transcend well beyond the original and intended remit of each individual issue or 
policy frame.  For those involved in the Scottish dynamic, opposition to anything nuclear is 
non-negotiable, with the only concession being a temporary extension of lifetimes for the two 
remaining nuclear power stations in Scotland to 2023 and 2030. While the shut-down date 
may be a few years away, it is already at this crucial stage that Scottish policy-makers would 
need to take the steps necessary to commission a new generation of nuclear power stations if 
nuclear energy is to continue in Scotland. As this is not forthcoming, a nuclear energy future 
in Scotland is highly unlikely if not impossible.  
The Scottish Government’s determined policy stance against anything nuclear does not 
necessarily reflect Scottish public opinion in general. In fact, public opinion poll results have 
been ambiguous if not contradictory regarding both civil and military nuclear issues, with 
outcomes depending heavily on the initiators of the surveys as well as the format and type of 
questions asked.2 Similarly, the Scottish Referendum of September 2014 did not bring about 
the result that the SNP Government was hoping for, with 55% of the electorate voting NO 
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and 45% voting YES to Scottish independence. While the current Scottish Government 
cannot claim full and unreserved public support for its anti-nuclear policy (and, indeed, its 
independence aim), it does nevertheless appear to have a public mandate in decision making: 
in an Ipsos MORI opinion poll of June 2012, 64% believed that the Scottish Parliament 
should make decisions on energy policy while 34% chose the UK Parliament and 2% were 
undecided. Opinion polls aside, as far as actors with vested interests are concerned, there 
does not appear to be a veto point in the Government’s anti-nuclear policy path either. True, 
pro-nuclear actors regularly use the media to express their condemnation of the Scottish 
Government’s policy. At the same time, the nuclear lobby and its advocates appear to have 
accepted their non-nuclear fate in Scotland. One indicator for this fate-acceptance is the 
dwindling of political party conference presence by nuclear energy lobbyists. Having 
previously attended political party conferences in Scotland, their presence at these 
conferences is not as ‘vociferous as it used to be, in fact pro-nuclear representations are now 
far and few’, according to an SNP MSP (interview, 8/3/2013). 
The above analysis suggests that simple explanatory avenues such as political populism and 
resource availability do not always explain the whole story of environmental or energy policy 
choices. It is therefore important to consider the storytelling and embeddedness of decision-
making in a wider, cultural and historical context. In the case of the Scottish (anti-) nuclear 
policy, a frame bridging between three complementary but separate issues emerged (i.e. civil 
& military nuclear plus Scottish self-determination) which fed into grassroots movements as 
well as large sections of the governing political party and its affiliates. The inter-connection 
between Scottish self-determination and anti-nuclear protest is particularly evident in the 
SNP, where the comparatively strong links between grassroots membership and leadership 
have facilitated the adoption of a clear anti-nuclear energy policy. Indeed, this overlap 
between Scottish self-determination and anti-nuclear sentiments is reflected in individuals 
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holding important positions in both spheres as well as the expression of shared meanings, 
stories and ambitions. This bridging lends added strength to the anti-nuclear cause, be it in 
the civil or military realms, displaying a dynamic that (arguably) cannot be found South of 
the Border. The Scottish parliamentary elections in May 2016 produced a minority SNP 
Government and while the result may have a knock-on effect on further Scottish policy-
making in general, it is unlikely that the slight change in the balance of power will have a 
knock-on effect on the nuclear discourse in Scotland. It is expected that the triangular 
bridging between policy frames will either continue or be further consolidated in the light of 
UK Government’s contrasting pro-nuclear stance. The author estimates that tensions resulting 
from pressing questions regarding the future of Trident and the future of nuclear energy in the 
UK will further consolidate and strengthen the above described policy frame-bridges in 
Scotland.  
An Afterthought 
While the focus of this study was on the Scottish nuclear energy case, with some comparative 
references to the rest of the UK, it would be interesting to extend this frame-bridging analysis 
to other case studies where similar dynamic frame bridges may be observed. For instance, in 
Germany the civil and military nuclear policy frames have arguably been bridged to great 
effect, although the context of national and cultural identity is different from that of Scotland 
and only marginally impacts on the German nuclear policy stance. Other settings, however, 
do not appear to produce the same bridging dynamic. In Japan, for instance, concerns over 
long-term energy security (specifically the long-term provision of energy) is forcing a de-
coupling (or: de-bridging) of civil and military nuclear energy frames at government level, 
causing a major divide between political elite and public opinion as evidenced in Japan’s 
recent move to re-start the nuclear programme (See 
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http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/01/uk-japan-nuclear-restarts-analysis-
idUKKCN0R022Y20150901).  
When comparing Scotland with the rest of the UK, it is noticeable how the nuclear energy 
discourse in England and Wales appears to be isolated from other political debates and 
therefore does not benefit from the same dynamic and reinforcement as the Scottish 
discourse. Baker and Stoker (2013) noted that anti-nuclear groups in England and Wales 
seemed to have taken their eyes off the nuclear ball following a long drawn-out battle on 
Sizewell B by the late 1990s. It could be argued that their Scottish counterparts have been 
able to maintain their anti-nuclear momentum by simply attaching the nuclear issue to the 
issue of Scottish self-determination. At this stage, these observations are speculative and the 
author would like to invite researchers to pursue these thoughts further. 
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